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New dynamic pricing strategies have emerged as a particularly useful tool
following advances in new technologies and the growing prevalence of Internet
transactions between companies and consumers (Haws and Bearden, 2006).
Research on revenue management in the travel industry is quite extensive,
especially in the tourism industry (Heo and Lee, 2011; Abrate et al, 2012;
Schwartz et al, 2012). Adoption of these technologies depends on a number of
internal and external dimensions: temporal; demand and production character-
istics; and repurchase intentions.
Aside from internal use of revenue management, research has recently empha-
sized its relevance to competitors in terms of the interrelated use of revenue
management techniques (Narangajavana et al, 2014). Price response systems help
operators to identify when competitors have introduced new fares into the
market, and to provide recommendations as how to respond to these changes.
This automation is essential, considering that there are more than one million
fare changes in any given day (Mumbower et al, 2014). Tsai and Hung (2009)
clarify the importance of competitive revenue management in practice, however,
it remains under-investigated in the literature. This lack of research is evident
in the tourism and hospitality industries. Among the scant evidence, Ropero
García (2013) showed a strong impact of competitive scenarios on tourist
apartments while Rosselló and Riera (2012) focused on the impact of low-cost
companies on the traditionally more stable prices of tour operator packages.
In the travel industry, following the liberalization of the airline market in
Europe in the late 1990s, the enormous growth of low-cost companies placed
great pressure on the established European traditional airlines, reducing prof-
itability of the traditional business model (Dennis, 2007). Furthermore, this
competitive arena is now intensified by the growing presence of high-speed rail,
at least in Europe (Castillo-Manzano et al, 2015; Delaplace and Dobruszkes,
2015) and China (Jeng and Su 2013). The Milan–Rome route is a perfect
example of this new form of competition, with a traditional airline operator,
two low-cost operators and two high-speed rail operators. To exemplify the
growing importance of the high-speed rail in this market consider that, in the
first trimester of 2012, the market share of train over air between Milan and
Rome (and vice versa) was 38%, while in the fourth trimester of 2014 train
surpassed air in this route with a 54% market share (Uvet, 2015).
This paper tests the application of revenue management and price discrimi-
nation techniques of different companies (for example, different fares between
classes and in different time periods prior to departure). In doing so, it enriches
the previous literature by investigating the complex short-run price interrela-
tions among intramodal competition (airlines competing with other airlines –
as well as train carriers competing with other train carriers – for the same city-
pair market) and intermodal competition (airlines versus trains).
The empirical application is based on the Milan–Rome route, which offers
a suitable case for analysing both intramodal and intermodal competition. The
next section presents the conceptual framework, revising the literature on price
competition and presenting the hypotheses that will be tested in the empirical
part of the paper. The subsequent sections describe the data and the empirical
model adopted to test the hypotheses, and then discuss the findings. The last
section presents the limitations and conclusions of the paper, with the impli-
cations for the tourism and travel industries.
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Conceptual framework
The framework is based on two strands of literature. First, the article presents
the application of revenue management and price discrimination techniques by
the travel operators to maximize their revenues. Then, it discusses in detail how
competition, and specifically intramodal and intermodal competition, shapes
these strategies. In this context the main contribution is on the supply-side,
by investigating the factors that influence the price set by operators in the short
run.
The travel industry has to cope with heterogeneity, perishability with high
sunk costs, cyclical demand and segments with different price elasticities (Bull,
2006). In this context, Dana (1998) claims that since consumers are heteroge-
neous in both their valuation and their demand uncertainty, a pattern of
advance-purchase discounts can increase load factors and profits. This is caused
by the low valuations of consumers who are more likely to buy in advance and,
from the supply-side, the certainty of allocations of a given number of seats
well in advance. Gaggero (2010) explains the non-monotonic intertemporal
profile of fares as follows: early bookers show a slightly inelastic demand;
middle bookers exhibit the highest demand elasticity; and late bookers book
tickets only a few days before departure. This last category is mainly composed
of business travellers, with fixed travel dates and destination while the two
former categories are composed mainly of standard and tourism customers, who
are more flexible and want to plan ahead. While a monopolist can set and
maintain high mark-ups for both categories, in an oligopolistic industry, when
competition increases, carriers lose this ability: mark-ups associated with the
fares paid by the less price-sensitive (business) travellers decrease and align with
those of the more price-sensitive standard travellers. Bergantino and Capozza
(2015) argue that this situation should be avoided because of the need to
preserve, through price discrimination, the mark-ups applied to business trav-
ellers.
Aside from advance purchase behaviour, the supply can benefit from offering
different attributes to account for the heterogeneity of customers’ preferences
with respect to travel choice (price, access time, comfort). Although Park and
Ha (2006) mention fares as one of the most important drivers of customers’
mode choice and predict a decline in the aviation demand, at least business
travellers were shown to be willing to pay more to improve connectivity, access
and journey time (O’Connell and Williams, 2005; Jung and Yoo, 2014). It
follows that for some segments low prices may not be sufficient to compensate
the consumer’s additional effort to reach secondary airports and fly at incon-
venient time slots, as, for example, a portion of Ryanair’s flights requires
customers to do. For instance, when looking at revealed preference data pro-
vided by travellers, Wang et al (2014) found that the magnitude of elasticity
for travel time was higher than the magnitude of elasticity for trip costs in the
business segment while the opposite held in the leisure segment. Thus, despite
a highly competitive context, the heterogeneity of product valuations across
customers can allow many companies to remain profitable (Kim et al, 2009).
Recently, investments in high-speed rail infrastructures have significantly
reduced travel time, enhancing mode competition between airlines and trains
for the business segment (Ivaldi and Vibes, 2008). Roman et al (2007) inves-
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tigate an example of this type of infrastructure in Europe, the Madrid–Barcelona
high-speed line. These authors pay attention to customers’ willingness to pay
and the level of demand needed to cover the high investment costs of such an
infrastructure. Behrens and Pels (2012), examining the consumers’ modal pref-
erences on the Paris–London route, highlight how the lack of data for the high-
speed train market prevents definitive conclusions to be drawn about the
interrelated competition mechanisms. In particular, there is no evidence regard-
ing the intramodal competition between different high-speed train carriers.
The competition between airlines and trains needs to be addressed in light
of the application of revenue management techniques, which allow operators
to adjust their prices rapidly in the short run. There are two main ways to apply
revenue management in practice. The first, generally named the supply- or
quantity-based perspective, places special emphasis on inventory capacity allo-
cation. The second, the price-based perspective, uses prices as the primary
tactical tool for managing demand. Gallego and van Ryzin (1994) show that
a mixture of both pricing and allocation schemes is a practical way to achieve
the best revenues and reach optimal results. We claim that the weight of this
mixture is different between airlines and high-speed trains. There is growing
evidence that airlines apply a mix of quantity- and price-based revenue man-
agement to maximize their revenues in a competitive context (Bitran and
Caldentey, 2003; Vinod, 2005; Chiang et al, 2007; Luo and Peng, 2007). This
phenomenon is explained in Netessine and Shumsky (2005). The basic idea is
that, to account for competition, airlines tend to base the allocation of set
inventory adopting typical price-based measure. More specifically, they adjust
for the demand distribution of each class and account for the prices of com-
petitors. While airlines, especially low-cost airlines, adopt price changes de-
pending on demand and purchase date (Alderighi et al, 2011; Piga et al, 2015),
in the high-speed train context various tariffs and classes are set way in advance,
favouring more traditional allocations based on the remaining seats for each
class.
The above framework above leads us to the following hypotheses.
H1: Travel companies offer advanced-purchased discounts to capture travel-
lers with low valuations.
H2: Both intramodal and intermodal price competition are intense, but only
within similar target segments (business travellers and standard travellers).
H3: The use of revenue management techniques is different between airline
and train industries.
H3a: Due to the number of tariffs and classes, high-speed trains apply
mainly quantity-based techniques.
H3b: Airlines react more than high-speed trains to changes in competitors’
prices due to revenue management systems built on price-based techniques.
While the core of the analysis is devoted to an investigation of the strategic
behaviours of operators in terms of advance booking policies and price reactions
to changes in competitors’ prices, the regression model includes a control for
two other variables that were shown to have a general impact on tariffs: peak
load versus off-peak load pricing and week day versus weekend price levels.
There is extensive literature on peak-load versus off-peak load pricing strategies
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in transport and tourism (for a review see Pan et al, 2015) and on the variation
of tariffs depending on the day in which the travel will take place (Stavins,
2001; Park and Ha, 2006). Nonetheless, it is an interesting research question
to assess whether and how operators deal differently with these variables,
depending on the customer segment targeted and the mode of transport.
Data and empirical model
The Milan–Rome route represents an ideal case study for our empirical analysis.
It is a route that attracts both business commuters and tourism customers
(Holloway and Taylor, 2006). There are several options for getting from Milan
to Rome. Aside from driving, five main options are available for a tourist or
business traveller: three airline companies (one traditional carrier, Alitalia, and
Table 1. Available fares and travel modes.
Alitalia Comfort Fullflex Comfort Easy Flex Easy
Number obs 1,793 2,296 2,311 1,910
Mean price 320.37 238.06 138.14 97.87
SD 63.93 63.19 30.61 14.88
Easyjet Flexy Standard
Number obs 602 603
Mean price 118.25 53.02
SD 43.22 23.51
Ryanair Standard
Number obs 235
Mean price 43.42
SD 34.86
Italo Base Economy Low-cost Promo
Smart Number obs 1,407 1,329 901 517
Mean price 88 58 45 31.6
SD 0 6.24 0.71 2.33
Prima Number obs 1,407 1,397 1,049 678
Mean price 117 73.6 55 48
SD 0 7.53 0 0
Club Number obs 1,403 1,365
Mean price 130 117
SD 0 0
Frecciarossa Base Economy Supereconomy
Standard Number obs 2,423 1,606 468
Mean price 86 51.68 35.35
SD 0 4.46 4.9
Business Number obs 2,295 2,157 1107
Mean price 116 80.57 49.07
SD 0 3.09 0.85
Executive Number obs 2,431 1,560
Mean price 200 160
SD 0 0
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two low-cost carriers, EasyJet and Ryanair) and two high-speed train operators
– Trenitalia (‘Frecciarossa’) and NTV (‘Italo’). This setting is suitable for a
comprehensive analysis of both intramodal (within airlines and within trains)
and intermodal (between airlines and trains) competition.
This study makes use of publicly available information on prices. All avail-
able options were monitored in a period aimed at representing a typical week
without any special events or festivity (20–26 May 2013). To simulate the
customer advance booking process, prices were checked at different points in
time, in particular: 1, 7, 15, 30, 45 and 60 days before the date of the journey.
For each travel option, all available fares – each characterized by some kind of
peculiarity in terms of restrictions or in terms of travel class – were collected.
To reduce biases in the comparison between the different companies, the
analysis was limited to the ‘one-way’ ticket options.1 Table 1 shows summary
statistics of the main fares available for the five operators, providing a first
picture of the revenue management strategies. In general, moving from the left
to the right of the table, fares are characterized by tariffs with lower prices but
more restrictions in terms of possible ticket changes or refunds as well as other
frills (such as snacks). There is some heterogeneity between airlines and trains
price differentiation. In the case of Alitalia, the highest fare might be considered
as the business class service, because it guarantees more leg space and greater
spaces between customers. In the case of trains, the distinction is even clearer,
with the class of the service associated with distinct coaches characterized by
different quality levels.
An initial consideration of the descriptive statistics provides initial support for
hypothesis 3. Airline prices are characterized by high within-fare variability. On
the contrary, the different train fares show a low variability (sometimes even zero),
but the quantity of available tickets reduces significantly moving from the left
to the right of Table 1. For instance, the super-economy ticket in the Frecciarossa
standard class is available on less than 20% of occasions; likewise, the promo
ticket in the Italo smart class is available around one in three times. Thus, train
operators prevalently apply quantity-based revenue management strategies.
Overall, Table 1 describes a rather complex set of options available for a typical
traveller. To deal with such complexity, we established a set of more standardized
alternative travel modes and associated prices (p), ending up with a total number
of 12,506 price observations. The eight travel modes are the following.
(a) Traditional carrier airline (Alitalia), standard class, operationalized as the
minimum available fare for booking a specific flight with Alitalia.
(b) Traditional carrier airline (Alitalia), business class, operationalized as the
Comfort Fullflex fare.
(c) Low-cost airline mode (Easyjet, minimum available fare).
(d) Low-cost airline mode (Ryanair).
(e) Frecciarossa train, standard class, minimum available fare.
(f) Frecciarossa train, business class, minimum available fare.
(g) Italo train, standard class (‘Smart’), minimum available fare.
(h) Italo train, business class (‘Prima’), minimum available fare.
Individual preferences will drive the ultimate choice of which ticket (if any)
to buy. Some people might consider as valid options only the more comfortable
business class tickets, while others might just look at the most convenient
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options. Some people might strictly prefer travelling by train (or by plane);
others might be more flexible. By looking at dynamic price evolutions in the
above categories, the main research question is whether (and how much) an
operator cares about price variations in competing segments when defining its
revenue management strategy. Implicitly, it is reasonable to expect a higher
degree of price correlations when customers exhibit a higher degree of substi-
tutability between the alternative options.
We propose a model in which the price depends on the day of the week,
the hour of the day, the booking time and the competitors’ prices, and in which
all these covariates interact with the travel modes defined above, in order to
examine specific price patterns. More specifically:
p = Σ
n 
βn * Typen +Σj,n βjn * Weekdayj * Typen + Σl,n βln * Hourl * Typen
+ Σ
m,n
βmn * Adbookm * Typen + Σr≠nβrn * Comppricer * Typen,
where the dependent variable (p) is expressed in logarithm; Type indicates a set
of eight dummies characterizing each of the eight travel modes (Alitalia stand-
ard and business, Easyjet, Ryanair, Frecciarossa standard and business, Italo
standard and business); Weekday indicates the day of the week (seven dummies);
Hour indicates a set of five dummies characterizing the different time slots
during the day (6–10 am; 10 am–1 pm; 1 pm–4 pm; 4 pm–7 pm; later than
7 pm); Adbook indicates a set of six dummies defined according to the number
of days of advance booking before travelling (for example, 60 days means that
the price refers to a ticket booked 60 days in advance); Compprice indicates the
minimum price available (in logarithm) for each of the alternative travel Type
within the same time slot (Hour). Thus, it reflects the presence of price
promotions in the potentially competing segments.2
The estimation strategy is based on a random effect panel data specification.
In particular, we aim to capture unobserved heterogeneity across each specific
train or flight departure (and across different travel categories within the same
train/flight departure). One major potential source of unobserved heterogeneity
is related to the occupancy rate: for example, we do not observe how many pas-
sengers have travelled in business class on the 6 am Frecciarossa train. The time
dimension of the panel is instead given by the six advance booking options
simulated for each journey (that is, by the fact that price information for each
journey was retrieved at 1, 7, 15, 30, 45 and 60 days before the date of the
journey).
Following our hypotheses development, the main interest is measuring βmn,
the impact of advance booking on prices (H1), and βrn, the relations between
the prices of competitors (H2 and H3). While doing so, the regression model
includes a control for possible asymmetric behaviour across operators between
weekdays and weekends (βjn), and variations in the transport option in peak
hours and off-peak hours βjn.
Results and discussion
Table 2 presents the estimated coefficients of the random effect panel regression
(R-squared: overall = 0.9250; within = 0.7226; between = 0.9584). First,
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control variables concerning the average difference between travel modes and
the impact of weekday and peak hours can usually be interpreted intuitively.
Not surprisingly, Ryanair is the cheapest option while, on average, Alitalia is
the most expensive carrier (especially in the case of business class), followed by
Frecciarossa business. As to day of the week, in almost all cases fares tend to
be lower on mid-week days, with a more accentuated discount associated with
the less expensive travel modes (in particular, Ryanair, Italo standard and
Frecciarossa standard). This might be caused by less expensive travel modes
being the preferred option for leisure customers, whose demand peak is at the
weekend. However, this discounting behaviour does not seem to be significant
in the case of the most expensive business tariffs (Alitalia business and Frecciarossa
business), with the extreme case of Alitalia which places the most convenient
price promotions at the weekend. This is coherent with the target segment of
Alitalia, mainly composed of business customers travelling during working
days. As to the within-day price variations, flights in the morning and evening
slots tend to be more expensive. In the case of trains the highest fares can be
found in late afternoon (4 pm–7 pm), with lower prices registered after 7 pm.
A possible explanation for such a finding is that peak hours are slightly different
for flights and trains, as peak hours for trains are anticipated (trains departing
directly from the city centre).
Table 2 highlights the core results concerning the advance booking (βnt) and
competitor price effects (βnn), quantifying such relationships. Analysing the
dynamic of a flight with respect to the booking date, one can observe that, as
expected, booking last minute is more expensive for all types of travel (H1).
However, the price difference with respect to booking in advance is maximum
for low-cost carriers (64.8% and 51.7% for Ryanair and Easyjet, respectively)
and minimum in the case of Alitalia business and Italo business, supporting
the idea that intensive dynamic revenue management is more common among
the cheapest categories that offer advance-purchase discounts.
As to the competitors’ effect on price, a positive sign suggests a potential
substitution between the two categories: since competitors’ prices are in log,
the coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. The coefficients describing
intramodal competition are highlighted in light grey in the matrix. Alitalia
business fares move independently, while low-cost carriers and the lowest
Alitalia fare tend to have similar moves. Whereas, within-train competition also
presents significant coefficients. Italo adjusts both its two tariffs to the corre-
sponding class level of Frecciarossa, and the same strategic behaviour can be
seen in the case of Frecciarossa standard. On the whole, these coefficients
provide support to H2, but, as an anomaly, Frecciarossa business fare seems to
depend on Italo standard fare rather than on the business one.
The results for intermodal competition (highlighted in dark grey) show some
kind of asymmetric behaviour and provide further support to the presence of
different revenue management strategies between trains and airlines (H3).
While train prices seem not to react significantly to airline ones, the prices of
low-cost carriers seem to adjust depending on the moves of Italo. Also, the
minimum available fare of Alitalia is significantly affected by both Frecciarossa
business and Italo standard tariffs. Regarding the intermodal competition within
similar target segments, the findings support H2 only partially. There are some
cases where this hypothesis holds: the reaction of Ryanair, Easyjet and the
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minimum tariff of Alitalia to the Italo standard tariff. Nonetheless, there are
other relationships that are more counterintuitive, like the effect of Italo
business tariff on the Ryanair pricing strategy.
Conclusion and limitations
The adoption of revenue and yield management techniques is very popular in
the tourism and travel industries and has been shown to have a positive effect
on load factors (Bilotkach et al, 2015). Nonetheless, the way operators react to
short-term competitors’ price variations is relatively unexplored in the empirical
literature. This paper attempts to fill this gap, providing a pricing regression
model applied to the passenger transport market. Specifically, it focuses on the
characteristics of intramodal and intermodal competition between airlines and
high-speed trains. Advance-purchase discounts tend to be higher for low-cost
products. In general, prices evolve coherently within the business and leisure
segments, but with some exceptions. Finally, price competition tends to be
asymmetric between trains and airlines, since only the latter appears to be
reactive to competitors’ price changes. These results suggest the adoption of
heterogeneous pricing strategies depending on the different type of supplier.
Interestingly, it appears that traditional carriers (Alitalia in our case) tend to
move independently from low-cost airlines, while low-cost airlines are following
them in their pricing strategies. This finding confirms the different supply
strategies adopted to increase revenues.
Through an examination of the impact of our control variables on the
empirical model, it appears that business-oriented operators generally present
higher prices during weekdays and peak hours, while low-cost operators present
higher prices during the weekend, consistently with tourism population pref-
erences.
The travel and tourism arena has started to investigate the advantages of the
adoption of dynamic pricing in different routes. Our contribution suggests that,
to have a complete picture, the analysis has to investigate intramodal and
intermodal options jointly when they are present, as travellers are generally
flexible and willing to switch to another mode of transport (Ivaldi and Vibes,
2008; Behrens and Pels, 2012). On the whole, these interrelated results suggest
the need for further studies to disentangle the complexity of relations between
different modes in tourism and transport settings. As found in the hospitality
industry by Lee and Jang (2013), revenue managers have to identify the best
profit maximization strategy. This can be obtained by monitoring the decisions
of competitors of similar quality and by accounting for asymmetric price
dynamics in decision-making processes.
Studying only one route makes it possible to consider properly all sets of
prices, which would be very difficult to gather for a large set of routes
(Dobruszkes et al, 2014). Nonetheless, this study might raise the issue of
representativeness in the complex relationships within and between modal
competitions. Analysts and researchers need to improve the quality of prediction
models when conducting research on a specific competition set. Based on a priori
theory, the structural equation model would have allowed the measurement of
indirect effects (Bentler, 2006). This is left for future research.
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Notes
1. Frecciarossa offers in addition some extra class differentiation: a ‘Premium’ option is available
as an intermediate level between standard and business service, while among the business
category it is possible to book the ‘business silence area’. Moreover, Alitalia, Frecciarossa and
Italo do offer some discount in case of ‘return tickets’ (on average, around 6–7% of the one-
way ticket); however, the dynamic of return ticket prices strictly follows the dynamic of one-
way ticket prices.
2. When an alternative was not available in a particular time slot, in order to simulate such a
‘scarcity’ in the supply without losing observations, we considered the highest price for that
travel type (actually, this mainly happened because Ryanair flights are not available in the central
hours of the day).
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